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The Effect of Public Sector Labor Laws on
Collective Bargaining, Wages, and Employment
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the effect of the different legal
environments for bargaining faced by public employees across
the states on wage and employment outcomes for union and
nonunion employees, and also on the extent of bargaining, using
cross-section, within-city, and longitudinal analyses based on
a newly-derived data set on public sector labor laws.
We find that:(1) the legal environment is a significant
determinant of the probability of collective bargaining
coverage; (2) collective bargaining coverage raises wages and
employment for covered employees; (3) a more favorable legal
environment increases wages for all employees, but
substantially reduces employment for employees not covered by a
contract, while slightly reducing employment for employees who
are covered by a contract. We also find evidence of
significant spillovers of union wage effects to non-covered
departments. We conclude by focusing on the effects of two
specific legal provisions -arbitrationand strike permitted
clauses -onwages and employment.
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The Effect of Public Sector Labor Laws on
Collective Bargaining. Wages, and Employment
Unionism in the public sector of the United States differs
in two fundamental ways from unionism in the private sector.
First, in the American federal system states enact separate
laws to regulate public sector labor relations in different
departments, creating vastly different legal environments for
collective bargaining by state and department. Provisions
range from prohibitions on bargaining to duty-to-bargain
requirements; the latter are often combined with impasse
resolution procedures such as compulsory arbitration or strike
permitted clauses. Even within a particular state, different
public employee groups are frequently covered by different
provisions. Second, because of the political context of public
sector labor relations, public sector unionism is likely to
affect a very different set of economic outcomes thanprivate
sector unionism. Whereas private sector unions are usually
viewed as raising wages, thereby reducing employment,public
sector unions are best thought of as increasing demand for the
services of union members, raising employment, publicoutput,
and taxes, as well as wages.
This paper uses new data on labor relations law by state
and department from the NBER Public Sector Collective
Bargaining Law Data Set, together with data from the Survey of2
Governments and the Current Population Survey, to examine the
economic relationships between these two distinct features of
U.S. public sector unionism. It seeks to determine in what
ways, if at all, differing legal environments affect the
outcomes in public sector labor markets, where outcomes include
obtaining a contract and levels of employment as well as wages.
It also examines whether legal environments favorable to public
sector collective bargaining affect outcomes largely through
increasing the probability jurisdictions end up with collective
contracts or largely through affecting the terms of contracts.
The principal finding of the paper is that the legal
environment has significant direct and indirect influences on
the economic outcomes of public sector labor markets. The
indirect effects occur because legal environments favorable to
bargaining increase the likelihood that a city-department is
covered by a collective contract. The direct effects, defined
as the impact of the law on outcomes holding fixed coverage,
differ from the effect of contract coverage: whereas coverage
raises wages and employment,1 a legal environment favorable to
bargaining raises wages but tends to reduce employment in the
relevant department. A plausible interpretation is that
coverage measures both the outward shift in demand for public
sector labor due to lobbying and the results of collective
bargaining, while the collective bargaining law variable
reflects more what unions can do at the bargaining table and
thus their ability to raise wages along demand curves, with3
consequent reductions in employment. We also find evidence for
significant "spillovers" of union effects on non-covered
departments across and within cities, with wages higher and
employment lower in departments without collective bargaining
contracts in states with strong collective bargaining laws.
I. Measuring the Legal Environment for Public Sector Labor
Relations
In the l950s, the legal environment for public sector
collective bargaining was, save for the exception of a few
cities and states, largely undefined; where specific public
sector legal provisions existed, they either outlawed strikes
or bargaining, or provided the "right to work" to non-union
employees. In ensuing years, the environment changed
dramatically. In the sixties there was a substantial body of
legislation legalizing public sector unionism. A second wave
of legislation in the seventies imposed a duty to bargain on
many public sector employers and developed procedures to
resolve impasses --eitherby mandatory arbitration or, in some
cases, by allowing strikes. By the 1980s, the legal
environment was drastically different than it had been 20-30
years earlier, with many states having enacted laws highly
favorable to public sector collective bargaining while others
had unfavorable laws.
How might the legal environment affect public sector
labor market outcomes?4
A priori, laws regulating public sector collective
bargaining might be expected to influence outcomes indirectly
by encouraging unionisation and the eventual signing of
collective contracts and directly by influencing the outcomes
of bargaining itself.
With respect to the "indirect effects" there is a sizeable
literature indicating that the legal environment exerts an
influence on unionisation in the public sector.L As the
literature on public sector unionism has generally found that
signed contracts have more of an impact on outcomes than
unionism per Se, we expect a favorable legal environment to
affect outcomes through increasing the probability that
bargaining units are established and agreements signed.
Unfavorable laws, by contrast, are expected to have the
converse effect, with laws that prohibit bargaining having
especially large negative effects on the existence of
contracts.
In addition to influencing the prevalence of contracts,
however, a favorable legal environment is likely to alter
outcomes directly. Unions are likely to do better at the
bargaining table with a "duty to bargain" provision, which
requires public employers to meet and bargain in good faith
with elected union representatives over terms and conditions of
employment, than with weaker collective bargaining legislation,
and may do best when such provisions include impasse resolution
procedures. Whether they do better with "strike permitted" or5
"compulsory arbitration" clauses is, by contrast, less obvious.
Initially, most public sector unions favored the right-
to-strike; more recently, attitudes have changed. From the
perspective of states, the question is not only whether these
clauses benefit unions in bargaining but how they affect
settlements in non-union cities as well. Comparison of
settlements reached through compulsory arbitration with results
from negotiated settlements in the same legal environment is
unlikely, as Farber and Katz (1979) have noted, to yield good
estimates of how arbitration affects outcomes because
arbitration is likely to bias negotiated settlementsaway from
the settlements that would have been negotiated in the absence
of the arbitration law. The same can be said of the situation
for strike laws. Hence, to evaluate the overall effects of the
legal environment it is necessary to make contrasts across
environments, as we do in this study.
The Data Set
To measure the legal environment for public sector
collective bargaining, the NBER, building on the work of
earlier analysts (the Department of Labor, the American
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, John
Burton, Berkeley Miller, and Joyce Najita),3 put together in
1985 a comprehensive data set on collective bargaining laws
across states for five basic groups: state employees,
municipal police, municipal fire fighters, non-college6
teachers, and other local employees. The data set, described
in detail in Valletta and Freeman (1985), covers five basic
legal categories: Contract Negotiation (bargaining rights),
Union Recognition, Union Security, Impasse Procedures, and
Strike Policy for the years 1955-1984. Depending on the
ultimate application, one can select certain variables from
this data set to measure the legal environment facing unions.
We focus on three main categories likely to affect economic
outcomes: the requirements for bargaining; the provisions for
dispute resolution; and strike provisions. Within each of
these categories, the legal provisions can be ordered from
those which most constrain the scope of public sector union
activities to those which allow the broadest scope for such
activities and hence provide the greatest probability of
obtaining a collective bargaining contract and influencing
outcomes.
In the area of bargaining rights, we distinguish between
five types of provisions, ordered from least to most favorable
toward public sector union activity: prohibition of bargaining;
no provision on bargaining; bargaining permitted; right to
"meet and confer" or "present proposals;" and duty-to-bargain.
The bargaining prohibited category reguires public employers to
reach a unilateral decision on the terms and conditions of
employment. The other categories allow public employers to
make unilateral decisions but permit bargaining, with express
permission encouraging bargaining more than does the implied7
permission of "no provision," while "meet and confer" or
"present proposals" requirements ensure that unions have a
voice in determining the terms and conditions of employment.
Finally, duty to bargain is the most favorable provision for
unions, guaranteeing that public employers will meet them at
the bargaining table.
In the area of dispute resolution, we distinguihbetween
non-binding intervention mechanisms (mediation and
"fact-finding") and binding arbitration. The non-binding
mechanisms each involve a neutral third party (individual or
group) whose role is to investigate and provide information
about the disputed issues (fact-finding) or simply attempt to
conciliate the parties to the dispute (mediation); but in
neither case is the third party empowered to force a
settlement. In binding arbitration, the neutral third party's
decision must be adhered to; we make no distinction here
between conventional "fact-finding"-type arbitration and final
offer variants. Even with non-binding intervention, risk-
averse public employers are more likely to deal with unions
than in the absence of potential intervention. Binding
intervention assures a signed contract.
Finally, in the area of strikes, we distinguish between
states which permit strikes and those that expressly prohibit
strikes. Most states fall into the former category. Many
attach specific penalties for individuals and unions that
violate the law; others leave this decision to the discretion8
of the courts. Since it is difficult to know in which case the
penalties are more severe, we have grouped all strike
prohibition laws into one category. Where strikes are
permitted, unions can force a contract from public employers;
in addition, unions may be able to utilize strikes and the
strike threat to obtain more favorable wage and employment
outcomes.
These laws are of course closely interrelated; for
simplicity we have chosen to represent them by a single
hierarchical index. Specifically, we associate with each
departmental group in each municipality in a particular year a
single figure indicating the legal scope for public sector
union bargaining activities in the state in which the
municipality is located. This hierarchical ordering is shown
in table 1. At the low end of our hierarchy are groups covered
by "bargaining prohibited" provisions; these groups are allowed
no scope for union activities. As we move toward the top of
the hierarchy, there is an increase in unions' ability to
create and exploit bargaining power. First, we have no
provision on bargaining, then bargaining permitted, followed by
the right to meet and confer, and required mediation or
fact-finding; then we get to bargaining categories, where
employers are required to bargain in good faith with employee
representatives; the addition of closure properties in the
bargaining process, in the form of strike permitted provisions
or binding arbitration, ensures a signed contract.9
Table 1: Distribution of Survey of Governments


























































Number of Observations - 18,541 3884 17,195 8160
1
The term "required" in this table
procedure is initiated automatically
request of at least one of the parties
indicates that the impasse
at some point in the impasse or by
.94 .052 .28 .12 .60














As a means of scaling our index, we have performed a
z-score transformation of the nine categories, so that for each
state-department-year we have a measure of the standard
deviations from the mean legal category across states for all
departments. The main advantage of this scaling technique,
which exploits the standard normal distribution, is that it is
sensitive to the number of groups in a legal category. A legal
environment which is particularly rare (such as "bargaining
prohibited") causes the z-scores to have more dispersion than
they would if "bargaining prohibited" was as common as the
other legal categories; this is consistent with the view that a
"bargaining prohibited" environment is more qualitatively
distinct than other environments. The z-score values
corresponding to each legal category are shown in table 1.As
an example of how this variable should be used, a change from
"no provision" (category 2) to "duty-to-bargain & strikes
permitted" (category 8) represents a 2.13 standard deviation
change in a department's legal environment; in'ilar
calculations can be made for other changes in the legal
environment. As the change from "no provision" to "strikes
permitted" was quite typical of states which adopted bargaining
legislation in the 1960s and 1970s, in our empirical work we
will use a two standard deviation change in the legal
environment as the base unit for assessing the impact of the
law on labor market outcomes.
To analyse the effects of the laws on economic outcomes we11
have added our law variables to two data sets which contain
information on public sector workers. The first is the Current
Population Survey (CPS), which is the Census Bureau's main
monthly survey of individuals. It has information on economic
and demographic characteristics of workers, and contains data
on whether a worker is a union member or is nonunion but
covered by a contract. Unfortunately, these data fail to allow
for the situation in which workers who are union members do not
have a contract -aninfrequent but not unheard of situation in
the public sector. The second data set -whichis more useful
for our purposes -isthe annual Survey of Governments (SOG),
also conducted by the Census Bureau. It contains data on
government employment (including various measures of unionism),
wages, and finances across all levels of government but the
federal, with detailed data by municipal department, making it
an excellent source of data to test our hypotheses on the
effects of the legal environment oncoverage, wage, and
employment outcomes. We analyse an extract containing data on
1153 cities in the United States for five municipal
departments: police, fire, sanitation other thansewerage,
streets and highways, and finance and general control personnel
(grouped together) for the years l972-198O; however, since
some data are unavailable in some years, we do not have a
complete 9-year panel. We also have data for the same cities
from the 1980 Census Summary Tape Files 1 and 3, which provide
a wide range of economic and demographic characteristics by12
city to use as control variables.
Our principal unionism variable is the collective
bargaining coverage of the department. As no coverage data is
available by department on the Survey of Governments, we had to
impute this variable from other information. Our estimate was
obtained by looking at whether or not a city has a collective
bargaining policy, the number of contractual agreements in
effect in the city, and the number of existing bargaining
units. Where the number of contracts exceed or are equal to
the number of bargaining units, each department with a
bargaining unit is consideredcovered.5 If the city does not
have a collective bargaining policy, or there are no bargaining
units in the city, or there are no contracts in effect, each
department in the city is considered not covered. In this way,
coverage was imputed for 86% of cities; the 14% of the pooled
sample for whom we could not make such imputations were not
used in the analysis. Since we only have consistent bargaining
unit data for the years 1977-1980, most of our analysis is
conducted on a pooled sample of the five departments across the
1153 cities for those four years. Approximately 21% of the
total pooled sample were covered by collective contracts. The
distribution of our legal measure across departments and states
in the two data sets is given in columns two and four of table
1. The Survey of Governments data record the proportion of
city-department-years in our various categories. The table
reveals a wide variation, with significant numbers of13
city-departments or workers in most of the nine groupings. The
CPS data show a similar pattern for the distribution of
individuals.
As our analysis seeks to differentiate between the
indirect and direct effects of legal environments on outcomes,
it is important to note that city-departments and individuals
with and without collective bargaining contracts are found
under all of the various legal environments. Columns three and
five of table 1 relate our nine legal environment categories to
the existence of a collective contract in the SOC and CPS data.
Considerable "off-diagonal" variation is demonstrated. There
are departments and individuals without contracts in states
with legal environments favorable to collective bargaining and
departments and individual with contracts in states with
unfavorable legal environments.
Given the differing legal environments and the existence
of departments and individuals with and without collective
contracts in favorable and in unfavorable environments, what
economic outcomes is the environment likely to affect?
II.Outcomes of Public Sector Union Activity
Following the standard "monopoly face" model of unions in
the private sector most studies of public sector unionism focus
on the effect of those unions on wages (see Freeman, l986b;
Ehrenberg and Schwarz, 1985; Lewis, this volume). While
obviously valuable in understanding one aspect of union14
impacts, the concentration on wage effects can lead to an
understatement of what public sector unions do and an incorrect
analysis of their welfare consequences.
The political context of public employment creates a
distinct environment for labor relations in which unions can
influence not only wage levels but also the overall demand for
labor and public sector output in a jurisdiction. Public
sector unions can directly affect the goals of elected
officials (or their representatives) sitting across the
bargaining table by campaigning for, or against, those
officials. While public sector unions can, and sometimes do,
campaign directly for higher pay, they are likely to do better
in the political arena by supporting candidates favorable to
public spending in areas where their members work. There are
numerous examples of such activity. Teachers campaign for
increased school expenditures and services. Policemen favor
candidates who want to spend more on law and order. Firemen
favor candidates likely to increase expenditures on fire
protection. That teachers are concerned with quality of
education, policemen with law and order, and firemen with
adequate fire protection, as well as with the effect of
expenditures on those activities on their pay, we do not doubt.
The point is not that these groups are trying to "trick" voters
into supporting additional expenditures to increasepay but
that increases in demand for services is the easiestway to
obtain increases in pay.15
Not only does the political process provide public sector
unions with greater opportunity to alter levels of demand for
services of their members than the market process permits
private sector unions to do, but it also necessitates such
behavior in order for collective settlements to be funded. In
the public sector -- unlikethe private sector -- collective
negotiations do not guarantee the funding of contracts:
so-called legislative vetoes can vitiate bargains, as
legislatures or councils refuse to raise the money to fund
signed contracts. For example, in the 1970s, despite signed
contracts college professors in the University of Massachusetts
system did not receive salary increases for several years
because the legislature did not allocate the funds. Taxpayer
revolts, as evidenced in Proposition 13 (California) and 2 1/2
(Massachusetts), have also been used by opponents of public
spending to limit potential union wage gains by capping tax
revenues or budgets. Hence, public sector unions must operate
in a wider sphere than do private sector unions. They must
convince voters to fund increased budgets, which invariably
will include more than just wages, whereas in the private
sector they have only to gain agreement with management at the
bargaining table. The terms "multilateral bargaining" and "end
run bargaining" are commonly used to refer to the situation in
which public sector unions bargain not simply with those across
the table from them but with other interested public parties as
well. In such bargaining, need for public services, public16
expenditures, and quality of services, as well as wage
packages, are often at stake.
The hypothesis that public sector collective bargaining
induces unions to seek to alter the demand for labor as well as
wages has several implications for evaluating the economics of
public sector labor relations. First, if unions shift demand
for services, they can increase rather than reduce employment,
potentially raising total expenditures for a given department
and taxes. Their economic effects on local governments may be
much greater than indicated from application of the standard
monopoly model analysis of union effects on wages. Second, to
the extent that unions succeed in raising demand for public
services as well as raising wages, a very different welfare
calculus must be used to evaluate their social impact. In
particular, whereas the normal welfare calculus of monopoly
unionism stresses the misallocation of labor due to reduction
of employment in the union sector, the appropriate analysis of
public sector unionism may have to examine changes in welfare
due to increased employment and output. When public sector
output is below the social optimum (due to inaccurate
revelation of preferences for public goods, for example), the
welfare effects are likely to be positive. When public sector
output is above the social optimum (due to "special interest"
pressures, for example) the welfare effects are likely to be
negative.
All told, if the argument that public sector unionism17
significantly affects demand for public output is correct,
current belief in the relatively modest impact of those unions,
based on wage studies, will have to be re-evaluated.
The Role of Legal Regulations
Given that public sector unions are likely to shift demand
for labor schedules as well as bargain for higher wages along a
given schedule, how might our measure of the legal environment
influence unions' ability to shift demand as opposed to
altering the wage and employment settlement on a demand curve?
Since our measure focuses on the extent to which the
environment is favorable to collective bargaining settlements,
it seems likely that it will have a greater effect on wages
than on the level of demand. For example, there is nothing in
a "strikes permitted" or "compulsory arbitration" clause in a
duty-to-bargain law that could be expected to increase the
political power of unions, as these laws are distinctly
oriented toward the outcome at the bargaining table. Hence, we
expect the legal environment to have a relatively greater
impact on wages than on the level of demand, and thus on wages
as opposed to employment, per Se.
Formally, to model the economic impact of public sector
unions and the direct impact of the legal environment we
postulate:
(1) A Demand Curve, which can be shifted by union




Wlog (wages) with elasticity of labor demand -
X—log(level of demand due to other factors)
R— log (resources spent by union to shift demand)
(2) A union objective function, dependent on wages and
employment, U —U(W,E)
(3) A function relating union wage gains in bargaining to
the resources devoted to bargaining, VW (R,L,S), where
R resources devoted to bargaining, Llegal factors that
alter the effectiveness of bargaining resources, and S —labor
supply factors that alter union effectiveness. For simplicity
we assume that the resources spent by the union to shift demand
have a constant proportional impact (b) on demand whereas the
resources used at the bargaining table have declining marginal
productivity (dW/dR>O and d2W/dR2<O), and where dW/dL>O,
dW/dS<O, and d2W/dLdR>O.
(4) A resource constraint on unions, R +R—R.
w 5
Theunion problem is to maximize (2) subject to (1), (3),19
and (4). It does this by selecting an appropriate level of
according to the following equilibrium relation:
(5) —(,7W'+b)/W' ,+b/W'
That is, the union divides its resources so that the marginal
rate of substitution in utility is equated to the relevant
marginal opportunity costs.
Given the unions' selection of R (and R with the fixed w 5
resource constraint), the model yields wage and employment
levels as functions of the factors affecting demand (X) and
those that alter the effectiveness of unions in bargaining (L
and S):6
(6) W —f(X,L,S);Eg(X,L,S)
To analyse the effect of the legal environment on the
union allocation of R and outcomes, we consider the
"substitution effect" when a favorable legal environment alters
the relative effectiveness of R and R by changing W' and thus
b/W'. When a more favorable environment increases the relative
ability of unions' to raise wages at the bargaining table,
b/W' falls; when it decreases the relative ability of unions'
to raise wages at the bargaining table, b/W' rises. Thus, the
law acts as if it was shifting the elasticity of demand.If,
as we assume, our measure of the favorableness of the law to20
collective bargaining has a greater impact on union's ability
to raise wages at the bargaining table, there will be a
tendency for the law to induce a shift toward wages, as opposed
to employment. Note, moreover, that since in this model
unionization does not affect the elasticity pe se, a given wage
increase will reduce employment according to ,notr +b/W'
Rather than seeking to estimate a union utility function
in our empirical work, we focus on the reduced form of the
model, contrasting log-linear versions of employment and wage
equations in union and nonunion settings. In the nonunion
setting we assume that employment and wages are set by the
interaction of supply and demand schedules, yielding reduced
form equations comparable to those in (6), though with
different interpretations on the coefficients. In the
simplest version our estimated model is of the following form:






where C —the0-1 collective bargaining coverage variable; L
our measure of the legal environment; and S reflects labor
supply factors, which affect nonunion settings via normal
supply and demand interactions and which affect union settings
through the effectiveness of the bargaining equation. Here bE
and CE reflect the full impact of coverage and the law on21
employment; they could be negative if the induced reduction in
employment due to wage increases counterbalance any increase in
employment due to a shift in demand. Similarly, the
coefficients bw andc reflect the full effects of coverage and
the law on wages; they are expected to be positive.
Finally, to allow for possible "spillovers" of legal
effects from covered to non-covered departments we also employ










where the coefficients e and e reflect interactions. In the w E
Lewis analysis, use of a coverage variable alone yields a
biased estimate of the true impact of unionism onwage and
employment outcomes, since it fails to account for union
"threat" effects on non-covered groups. In our formulation,
the legal environment is used to identify departments for whom
this "threat" effect is important. To identify separately the
"full" effect of unionism (without threat effects), the
threat-adjusted union effect, and the threat (legal) effect, it
is sufficient to interact and include separately the legal and
coverage variables, and to have covered and not-covered
departments in all of our nine legal categories. The latter22
requirement has been demonstrated in table 1; our model is
constructed to meet the former.
Finally, note that equations (9)-(lO) do not allow for
supply or demand factors beyond the law to have differential
effects in union and nonunion environments. Since the supply
and demand factors operate through different routes in the two
settings one might expect them to have different impact
coefficients, with in the extreme case some variables affecting
outcomes in one setting but not on the other. While we will
test for such interactive effects (reported in note 18), our
focus is on the overall law and collective bargaining
coefficients, justifying the simplifications in these
equations.
III. Estimates of the Effect of the Legal Environment and
Contract Coverage on Labor Market Outcomes
In this section we present our estimates of the effects of
the legal environment on labor market outcomes. First, we show
that contract coverage is closely related to the legal
environment; then we examine the effect of the legal
environment on employment and wages, by department,
with/without controls for coverage. Next we compare
departments within a city by inclusion of city dummies and then
use a longitudinal (before-after) design to deal with the23
potential problem of omitted department-specific variables. We
conclude with an examination of the effects of arbitration and
strike permitted clauses on wages and employment.
Coverage
Table 2 reports the results of linear regression model
estimates of the relation between the legal environment and
collective bargaining coverage, using CPS data for 1984, and
SOC data for 1977-1980. The CPS regressions were performed on
four public employee groups: state employees, teachers, police
and firefighters, and "other local" employees, with workers in
managerial occupations deleted since managerial employees are
typically excluded from coverage by public sector collective
bargaining law. The Survey of Governments sample includes
observations for the five municipal employment groups described
earlier (police, fire, sanitation other than sewerage, streets
and highways employees, and finance and general control
personnel)7 across a sample of 1153 cities with populations
greater than 10,000 (in the 1980 Census) for each of the years
1977-1980. In each regression the dependent variable takes the
value 1 if the department or individual is covered by a
collective bargaining contract, and the value 0 if not.8 In
general, models with dichotomous dependent variables are best
estimated with probit or logit models since each constrains the
fitted values to lie between 0 and 1, while the linear
probability model does not. However, the linear model performs24
well where the dependent variable has a mean which is bounded
well away from the endpoints of the (0,1) interval, as is the
case for most of the coverage variables in our sample. The
linear model is also computationally less expensive than the
non-linear models, particularly in large samples. We therefore
use the linear model in our coverage estimations.
The top panel of table 2 records the results of our
analysis for the CPS; the bottom panel gives the results for
the SOC. As can be seen in the table, the legal index has a
significant positive effect on the probability of coverage in
each cross-section linear model. In the CPS calculations the
estimated coefficients range from approximately .10 to .13.
Thus, a two standard deviation increase in the legal index
increases the probability of coverage by about 20-26 percentage
points (as noted in Section I, we use a two standard deviation
change as our base to assess the impact of changes in the legal
environment). Because the means of the variables are roughly
equi-distant from one-half this also implies approximately
equal logistic coefficients.9 The SOC coefficients range from
.014 to .21, roughly parallel to the range in coverage rates;
the implied logistic coefficients, while wider in dispersion
than in the CPS, again imply large positive effects for the
legal index on the probability of coverage, with the exception
of sanitation workers.
An important question to ask is whether or not the law per
se increases collective bargaining coverage or whether it25
Table 2: Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors (in
parentheses) for the Relation Between the Legal Environment
and Collective Bargaining Coverage, CPS and SOC Data
CPS Cross-Section (1984)1
State Police & Other
Employees Teachers Fire Local
Legal Index .13 .10 .10 .11
(.008) (.010) (.020) (.008)
Mean of 0-1 .39 .74 .75 .38
Coverage Variable
R2 .23 .20 .20
Number of 5340 3591 741 7523
Observations
Other variables controlled for in each regression are:
dummy variables for educational attainment (4), age (5), region
(3), female, black, city size (2), and firefighters in the
police and fire regression, and alternative wages in the
individual's SMSA.
The CPS file used includes outgoing rotation group
observations from each of the 12 monthly samples for 1984.
SOC (Pooled Sample, 1977-80)
Streets Finance
Sani- and and
Police Fire tationHighways Control
Legal Index .21 .19 .014 .073 .062
(.008) (.009) (.005) (.007) (.006)
Mean of 0-1 .40 .39 .052 .13 .073
Coverage Variable
R2 .38 .32 .069 .17 .12
Number of 3904 3505 3247 3906 3957
Observations
Other variables controlled for in each regression are:
population. (and interactions with three city-size dummies), per
capita income, median household income, median property values,
percent of population with income below 75% of poverty level,
percent black, percent high school graduates, percent with I to
3 years college, percent college graduates, percent attended
graduate school, region dummies (3), and year dummies (3).26
simply reflects strong unionism in the area.To test this we
include in our coverage regressions a variable measuring the
percentage organized by department (i.e., the percentage of
full time employees in the department who are members of a
union or employee association). The results of this
calculation for the Soc data set are shown in table 3.For
simplicity in presentation we use a pooled sample for all
departments, which yields coefficients intermediate between
those for the departments in table 2 (see column 1).Inclusion
of the percentage organized in column 2 shows that percentage
organized has a large effect on the probability of coverage,
but its inclusion does not eliminate the effect of the law,
indicating that even where union and association membership is
high, a bargaining law serves to legitimize the bargaining role
of public sector unions. This is consistent with the findings
of Saltzman (this volume) for Ohio and Illinois, where passage
of laws was followed by significant increases in contract
coverage, even in highly organized jurisdictions.
Finally, it may be argued that our cross-section results
are biased due to the omission of a variable which is
positively related to both municipal employee coverage and the
legal environment. The best method to correct for this
potential problem would be to perform a longitudinal analysis
on departments. To do so requires variance over time in the
coverage and legal index variables. However, we only have
coverage data for the years 1977-1980, when there was virtually27
Table 3: Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors (in
parentheses) for the Relation Between the Legal Environment and
Collective Bargaining Coverage, Controlling for Percentage
Organized in the Department, SOC Data
Pooled. 1977-80 Within City Analysis1
Legal Index .12 .071 .11 .097
(.004) (.004) (.010) (.010)
Percent Union Members - .42 - .20
in Department (.008) (.009)
Police .28 .25 A A
(.009) (.008)
Fire .28 .22 A A
(.009) (.008)
Streets and .064 .063 A A
Highways (.008) (.008)
Sanitation - -
CityDummies no no yes yes
Mean of 0-1 .23 .23 - -
CoverageVariable
R2 .29 .41 .37 .40
Number of 13744 13744 11612 11612
Observations
A: Included but not reported; coefficient not comparable to
basic cross-section coefficients due to the inclusion of
department-demographic variable interactions.
Other variables controlled for in each regression are:
population (and interactions with 3 city-size dummies), per
capita income, median household income, median property values,
percent of population with income below 75% of poverty level,
percent black, percent high school graduates, percent with 1 to
3 years college, percent college graduates, percent attended
graduate school, region dummies (3), and year dummies (3).
In addition, the within city regressions include interactions
between the demographic controls and the police, fire, and
streets & highways department dummies.
1
Standard errors corrected for inclusion of city dummies.28
no longitudinal variation in the legal variable. Instead, we
construct a different but similar experiment, which involves
calculating the means for our basic cross-section variables
within cities and differencing these means from the department
specific values to sort out coverage and the law within cities.
Letting C—coverage, X—nieasured city characteristics, L—the
legal index, 0—the omitted city characteristic, and the
subscripts d and c denote department and city respectively, we
have (ignoring the constant and the disturbance term):
(ll)C —AX +bL +0 dc dc c dc c
(12) C —AX + bL + 0
CCC C C
where C and L are city averages and A is a vector of the
c c c
average across departments of the coefficients on the city
characteristic variables. Differencing (12) from (11),
we obtain:
(13) C -C = (A -A)X + b(L -L) dc c dc c c dc c
The omitted city effect disappears, and we can accurately
estimate the coefficient b. This technique is essentially
equivalent to the inclusion of city dummies in a full sample
cross-section regression. In practice, allowing the A
parameters to vary by department in the pooled regression
requires inclusion of interactions between the department
dummies and city characteristic variables; this is done in the
reported regressions. The results from this model are shown in29
columns 3 and 4 of table 3, and they confirm the basic
cross-section results. An employee group with a relatively
more favorable legal environment is more likely to be covered
than other groups in the same city. Without controlling for
percentage organized, the magnitude of this probability
difference is approximately the same (.22 for a two standard
deviation change in the law) as that obtained in the
cross-section regressions. Inclusion of percentage organized
reduces the estimated coefficient by only a small amount, from
.11 to .097.
The results of our experiments using both CPS and SOC data
sets, and using percentage organized as a separate variable,
are clear: the legal environment in a state is a key
determinant of whether or not a particular city-department is
covered by a collective bargaining contract.
Wages and Emtloyment
We now turn to our reduced-form estimates of the direct
and indirect impact of the legal environment on wage and
employment outcomes. By direct we mean effects holding fixed
contract coverage; indirect effects are obtained by equations
which exclude the coverage variable. Table 4 gives the results
of our basic wage regression for the CPS. Here we regress the
log of usual hourly earnings for each individual in the sample
on the legal index, contract coverage, a legal index-contract
coverage interaction variable, human capital and demographic30
Table 4: Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors (in
parentheses) for the Effect of the Legal Environment and
Collective Bargaining Coverage 1n Ln(Usual Hourly Wage)
Current Population Survey, 1984
Legal Coy-Legal 2
Group Index CoverageInteraction .
StateEmployees .033 - - .365340
(.008)
.014 .15 - .375340
(.008) (.013)
.003 .15 .033 .37 5340
(.009) (.013) (.033)
Teachers .029 - .243591
(.009)
.017 .12 .25 3591
(.009) (.015)
-.009 .14 .036 .25 3591
(.015) (.016) (.016)
Police & .033 - .30741
Firefighters (.016)
.018 .14 .33 741
(.016) (.030)
.038 .14 -.033 .33 741
(.024) (.030) (.028)
Other Local .037 - - .357523
Employees (.007)
.020 .15 - .377523
(.007) (.010)
.015 .15 .015 .37 7523
(.008) (.011) (.011)
Other variables controlled for in each regression are:
dummy variables for educational attainment (4), age (5), region
(3), female, black, city size (2), and firefighters in the
police and fire regressions, and alternative wages in the
individual's SMSA.
The CPS file used includes outgoing rotation group
observations from each of the 12 monthly samples for 1984.31
controls, and an "alternative wage" variable for each
individual based on his department and SMSA to reflect the
opportunities for those workers in the private sector)0 The
direct and indirect impact ofthe legal environment is
estimated to be on the order of 6-8% for a two standard
deviation change in the variable. The coverage effect on wages
is about 12-15%. Its inclusion approximately halves the
coefficient on the legal index. Finally, the coefficient on
the legal index-coverage interaction suggests that for state
employees and teachers most of the benefits of a more favorable
legal environment are captured by groups which actively
bargain, but that for police & fire and other local employees,
there are considerable across-city spillovers.
As noted above, the Soc data set is more suited to our
purposes, as it enables investigation of both the wage and
employment effects of labor laws and public sector union
activities. Table 5 records the results of our cross-section
wage and employment analysis for the SOC data set. Panel A
shows the wage results. Here we regress the log of average
full-time monthly earnings in a municipal department on the
legal index, contract coverage, a legal index-contract coverage
interaction variable, demographic characteristics of the city,
and year dummies (a complete variable list is provided in the
table). Our estimate of the direct and indirect effects of the
legal environment on wages is approximately 8% for a two
standard deviation change in our scale.11 The regression with32
Table 5: Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors (in
parentheses) for the Effect of the Legal Environment and
Collective Bargaining Coverage on Wages and Employment, SOC
Data
Pooled Cross-Section, 1977-1980 (N18,382)
Panel A -Ln(Monthly Salary per Full-Time Employee in Dept.)







Panel B -Ln(Number of Full-Time Employees in Dept.)






R2 .70 .71 .71
Other variables controlled for in each regression are:
population (and interactions with three city-size dummies), per
capita income, median household income, median property values,
percent of population with income below 75% of poverty level,
percent black, percent high school graduates, percent with 1 to
3 years college, percent college graduates, percent attended
graduate school, region dummies (3), year dummies (3), and
department dummies (4).33
coverage in column 3 shows that contract coverage raises wages
by about 6%, and attenuates the effect of the law variables
only moderately, implying that the bulk of the effect of the
laws on wages is direct rather than indirect through affecting
coverage. The interaction term coefficient is small and
insignificant, suggesting that there are substantial spillover
effects from covered to not covered departments.12
The analysis in section 2 suggested that public sector
unions are especially likely to use their political and
lobbying influence to raise demand for labor and thus increase
employment as well as wages. To test this notion we have used
the Soc data set to estimate employment equations comparable to
13
our wage equations.
Panel B of table 5 presents the results of our cross-
section investigation. The dependent variable is the log of
full-time employment in each department-city unit;14 the
independent variables are the same set of city characteristics
as used in the Panel A wage regressions, including city
population and our measures of the legal environment and
contract coverage.
The table shows the expected positive impact of strong
unionism -inthe form of departments with collective
contracts -onemployment: coefficients of about 21 to 24%.
This is consistent with the findings of Zax and others on
employment in unionized city-departments using other data sets.
The big surprise in the calculation is the substantial negative34
impact of a favorable legal environment on employment, which is
estimated to reduce employment by about 11 to 17% for a two
standard deviation change in the legal environment.
Regressions in which the observations are weighted by city
population yield modestly smaller but comparable negative
coefficients. The interaction between the legal index and
coverage shows, moreover, that the negative impact of favorable
laws on employment occurs largely in non-covered departments,
with a two standard deviation change in the legal environment
decreasing employment by only a small amount in covered
departments 15
How can we interpret these results?
There are two possible explanations. First, using our
Section II model, it may be that the legal environment does
indeed enhance union power largely at the bargaining table, so
that the legal index reflects movement along a demand curve to
a relatively greater extent than shifts in the demand curve,
compared to the effect of collective bargaining coverage. The
negative impact of favorable laws on employment in non-covered
cities, might, moreover, be attributable to the impact of the
wage spillovers found in our wage regressions, which workers
are unable to offset through lobbying in the absence of a
strong union. As we found the wage effects of the legal index
to be larger in the noncovered sector, however, this
explanation requires one of two additional facts: that the
elasticity of demand for labor is greater in the non-covered35
cities (a pattern consistent with findings for private sector
unions, in Freeman & Medoff 1981, and Allen 1983, among
others); or that unions are able to shift out the demand curve
more when legal environments are more favorable, leading to a
smaller estimated reduction in employment for the covered
sector.
A second possible interpretation is that the results are
spurious, due to inadequate specification of the factors that
determine public sector employment levels and omission of
important department-specific employment determinants across
cities (i.e. crime rates, potential fire loss, tons of
sanitation generated, etc.). To assess the validity of the
estimated negative effect of the legal environment on
employment, and to further test the wage results, we have
performed two additional analyses of wages and employment:a
within-city comparison analogous to our earlier within-city
coverage analysis, and a longitudinal analysis.
Panel A of table 6 presents the results of our wage
analysis using the same type of within city model as discussed
in our coverage analysis. The dependent variable in this
regression is the difference between the log of department
wages and the average log wages for all 5 departments in the
city. The independent variables (legal index, coverage, and
the legal-coverage interaction) were formed in a similar
fashion.16 As can beseen in the table, the coefficient
estimates from this model show much smaller effects of the36
Table 6: Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors1 (in
parentheses) for the Effect of the Legal Environment and
Collective Bargaining Coverage on Wages and Employment, SOC
Data (with City Dummies)
Within City Analysis (Pooled Data, 1977-1980. N —13,960)
Panel A -Ln(Monthly Salary per Full-Time Employee in Dept.)





- - - .003
Interaction (.012)
Panel B -Ln(Number of Full-Time Employees in Dept.)








Other variables controlled for in each regression are:
population (and interactions with three city-size dummies), per
capita income, median household income, median property values,
percent of population with income below 75% of poverty level,
percent black, percent high school graduates, percent with 1 to
3 years college, percent college graduates, percent attended
graduate school, region dummies (3), year dummies (3),
department dummies (4), and interactions between the city
characteristic variables and four department dummies.
1Corrected for inclusion of city dummies.37
legal environment and of coverage on wages than do the
equations without city effects. One possible interpretation is
that, in fact, our cross-section regressions overstate the true
union and legal effects; as a longitudinal analysis to be
discussed shortly shows little diminution of legal effects, we
did not believe this to be the correct interpretation. A
second interpretation is that there are considerable
within-city spillovers among departments, an issue developed in
depth by Ichniowski and Zax in this volume. Our findings in
panel A are consistent with their evidence of considerable
within-city wage spillovers.
The results of the within-city employment regressions are
given in panel B of table 6. They show slight positive rather
than negative effects of the legal index on employment and
again reveal large positive effects of coverage on employment.
As just noted, the former should not be taken as strong
evidence against any negative employment effects for the legal
environment, due to the apparently sizeable across-department
within-city spillovers found by Ichniowski and Zax. We place
greater weight on the longitudinal calculations contained in
table 7; these are discussed below.
Longitudinal Analyses
A standard objection to union wage studies based on
cross-section data is that the coefficients on unionization are
biased because of omitted characteristics correlated with38
unionism and wages.
To deal with this problem we have performed a
longitudinal analysis relating changes in wages (employment) to
changes in the legal environment, conditional on wages
(employment) in the base year. We perform this analysis on Soc
department data between 1972 and 1980. Over this period we
find considerable changes in legal environments; approximately
40% of the sample changed legal categories over the period,
with about 15% of those experiencing a change of five or more
legal categories. The changes are largely shifts from duty to
bargain provisions to arbitration and from meet and confer
provisions to duty to bargain provisions. There is
unfortunately a cost to extending our analysis back to 1972;
because the 1972 SOC neglected to gather data on bargaining
units, we cannot control for changes in coverage in the period
and thus are unable to divide our legal environment effects
between their direct and indirect impacts.
Our specific longitudinal model is based on the following
equations (with department subscripts omitted):




where the subscripts 0,1 refer to the beginning and end periods
of our analysis; where D is the omitted department factor;39
where p1 and are independent disturbances; and where we
allow the coefficients on the control variables X (which have
no time subscript) and on the omitted factor to vary over time.
By substitution, we obtain




Leastsquares estimates of Equation 16 will not yield
unbiased or consistent parameter estimates since the residual
is negatively correlated with W0. The coefficient onW0
will be biased downward and, given a correlation betweenW0 and
L, the coefficient on L1 will also be biased. While there is
no easy way around this problem, the extent of the bias can be
assessed by treating -Ape as an omitted variable correlated
with w0 and applying standard bias formulae together with prior
estimates of the extent to which the variation inW0 is due to
Our analysis, described in detail in Appendix A to the
paper, suggests that the resultant bias is relatively modest,
reducing the estimated coefficient on L1 by about 4% and the
estimated coefficient on W0 by about 6% (in absolute value).
As the change in the estimated coefficients is negligible (it
is never more than .001 for the legal variable coefficients),
we only report uncorrected coefficients in table 7.
Turning to the results of our longitudinal analysis in
table 7, panel A gives the estimated coefficients for equation
(16) with the change in wages as the dependent variable. The40
regression shows that the 1980 legal index variable has a
positive effect; the estimated coefficient is .024 with a
standard error of .004. Partitioning the sample into those
departments that were covered and those that were not covered
by a contract in 1980, we find that departments covered in 1980
had a slightly larger estimated wage gain than those not
covered in 1980; these results are shown in columns (2) and (3)
of table 7.
Overall, comparing these figures with our earlier
cross-section estimates, we see that the longitudinal analyses
yield somewhat smaller figures than those in the cross-
section,17 implying that there is some omitted variable bias in
the cross-section regressions due to department factors, but
that the legal effect is still significant. This should not be
surprising: the legal variable is a state-based measure,
whereas any omitted department factor is city-department based
and hence unlikely to be highly correlated with a state-level
variable.
Panel B of table 7 presents similar regression results for
employment. In these calculations we relate 1972-80 changes in
log employment across city-departments to the legal index in
1972 and 1980, using the model set out in equations (14)-(16).
As noted for the wage analysis, we lack a coverage variable
from the 1972 data set and thus are unable to test for coverage
effects on employment along with the effects of the legal
index. We find modest negative effects of the legal41
Table 7: Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors (in
parentheses) for the Effect of the Legal Environment and
Collective Bargaining Coverage on Wages and Employment, SOC
Data, Longitudinal Model
Longitudinal Analysis (Change from 1972 to 1980)
Panel A -Ln(MonthlySalary per Full-Time Employee in Dept.)
Covered1 Not Covered
Full Sample Depts. Depts.
(N=5281) (N=1044) (N=3474)
1OQC 5 .1. LI tL S ., ¼) '.1 ¼1 t -t . ¼) t ¼) . ¼) t. S
(.004) (.008) (.005)
Legal Index 1972 -.002 .002 -.013
(.005) (.008) (.007)
Ln (1972 wages) -.66 -.62 -.69
(.012) (.026) (.015)
Panel B -Ln(E Number of Full-Time Employees in Dept.)
Covered Not Covered
Full Sample Depts. Depts.
(N528l) (Nl044) (N3474)
Legal Index 1980 -.037 -.029 -.037
(.010) (.016) (.014)
Legal Index 1972 -.010 -.016 -.029
(.013) (.017) (.019)
Ln (1972 wages) -.31 -.40 -.31
(.010) (.022) (.012)
Other variables controlled for in each regression are:
population (and interactions with three city-size dummies), per
capita income, median household income, median property values,
percent of population with income below 75% of poverty level,
percent black, percent high school graduates, percent with 1 to
3 years college, percent college graduates, percent attended
graduate school, region dummies (3), and department dummies
(4).
1Refers to departments covered by a contract in 1980; data on
1972 coverage is unavailable.42
environment on employment, consistent with our basic
cross-section analysis.
To see whether the negative effect of employment is
largely a phenomenon in non-covered departments, we further
decompose the data set by 1980 coverage. The results, shown in
columns (2) and (3) of table 7, indicate that employment is
indeed reduced more in departments that are not covered than in
departments that are covered.
Overall, the findings from the longitudinal analyses are
consistent with the cross-section finding that a more favorable
legal environment increases wages but reduces employment in
both covered and non-covered departments, and that the wage
effect is perhaps slightly larger while the negative employment
effect is smaller in covered departments. Although these
results are not reproduced in the within-city analysis, we
attribute the difference to wage and employment spillovers
similar to those found by Ichniowski and Zax (using similar
18 19 data) in this volume.
Differences Between CPS and SOG Wage Results
Comparing the CPS-based and SOC-based analyses in tables 4
and 5, the reader will notice that while the direct and
indirect effect of the legal environment on wages is of
comparable magnitude between the data sets, the effect of
coverage differs noticeably, with the CPS yielding markedly
larger coverage coefficients than the SOC. What might explain43
the difference in results?
One possibility is that the CPS data, based on
individuals, gives greater weight to large departments than
does the SOC and that coverage effects differ by size of
department. To test this we re-estimated the equations in
table 5 weighting the department observations by city size; the
coverage coefficients fell rather than increased in size,
indicating if anything that union effects were larger in
smaller cities. Indeed, decomposing the SOC data by city size
and running the same model as in column 2 of table 5 shows a
coverage effect on wages of .00 in cities with a population of
500,000 or more; a coverage effect of .019 in cities of
250,000-500,000; a coverage effect of .015 in cities of
50,000-250,000; and an effect of .071 in cities with less than
50,000 in population. In short, we reject the notion that our
different wage results are due to city size effects.
A second possibility is that the lower coverage effects in
the SOC are the result of a different mix of occupations than
in the CPS. To test this we estimate separately coverage
effects for the two SOC groups for which the data sets overlap:
police and fire, and other local employees.20 Our estimates
show coverage effects comparable to those in table 5 (.061 for
police and fire; .049 for other local employees). Hence, this
is not the reason for the differences. -
Athird possibility is that the results differ because of
timing; perhaps public sector union effects increased from 198044
(the last year of our Soc analysis) to 1984.To test this we
used the 1980 May CPS to estimate union coverage effects for
the groups with significant sample size: teachers, state
employees, and other local employees. Our results show that
the estimated CPS coverage effects are in fact larger in 1980
than in 1984, which rejects a change-over-time explanation of
our findings.21
In sum, we find that one obtains larger estimates of the
effect of coverage on wages in CPS than in SOC data for reasons
that are not readily explicable. Similar differences have been
obtained in comparing CPS-based private sector union wage
effects and effects from establishment-based surveys (Freeman,
l986a), and also in comparing CPS-based estimates of
public/private pay differentials with estimates from
establishment-based surveys (Freeman, 1985). The lesson is
that to evaluate public sector union wage effects, one must
examine both types of data, and must be careful not to mix the
two types of data in comparisons over time.
The Impact of Arbitration and Strike Permitted Provisions
Throughout our analysis of public sector bargaining law
and its impact on public sector union power, we have focused on
our broad index measure of the legal environment. However, the
frontier of current public sector labor law debate concerns
arbitration and to a lesser extent (because they are less
common) strike permitted clauses in public sector labor45
relations. What does our data tell us about the effects of
these provisions on wages and employment?
To answer this question we have estimated wage and
employment equations on a sample limited to departments covered
by duty-to-bargain or stronger clauses in 1980, with 0-1
arbitration and strike-permitted dummy variables as the key
independent variables. We estimate equations using both
cross-section data for 1977-80 and longitudinal data from
1972-80. Our results, shown in table 8, indicate that strike
permitted clauses tend to increase wages and to reduce
employment in the cross-section, indicative of movement along a
demand curve. However, both effects are positive in the
longitudinal estimation, suggesting the presence in strike
permitted departments of an omitted effect which is negatively
related to employment levels.
For the quantitatively more important arbitration clauses,
we obtain unexpected cross-section results: reductions in
wages and in employment. Disaggregating our sample by whether
or not a department is covered by a contract (in 1980 for the
longitudinal model), we see that for covered departments,
arbitration has essentially no effect on wages and a positive
effect on employment. In light of other research which finds
little or no effect of arbitration on wage settlements
(Ashenfelter and Bloom 1984; studies cited in Freeman 1986b),
but shows great effects on illegal strikes (Ichniowski 1986),
this result will come as no surprise. What is surprising is46
Table 8:OLS Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors (in parentheses)
for Comparison of the Effect of Required Arbitration and Strike Permitted
Laws on Wages and Employment, Soc Cross-Section (Pool1d, 1977-1980) and




Arbi- Strikes Arbi- Strikes cate-
tration Perm. tration Perm. gories W E
1980 1980 1972 1972 1972 1972 1972
Full Sample
Cross Section -.023 .014 - - -
(N—ll,396) (.005) (.007)
Longitudinal .005 .032 -.014 -.061 .003 -.69 -
(N-2922) (.010) (.015) (.012)(.024) (.011) (.017)
Covered2 Departments
Cross Section -.002 .024 - -
(N=3l3l) (.009)(.012)
Longitudinal .011 .093 -.020 -.12 -.020 -.64
(N=853) (.016)(.026) (.016)(.045)(.015) (.027)
Not Covered Depts.
Cross-Section -.073 .006 -
(N64l0) (.008)(.008)
Longitudinal
-.026 .004 -.029 -.055 .032 -.73
(N.1468) (.018) (.022) (.026)(.034)(.019) (.025)
Panel B -EmploymentEffects
Full Samule
Cross Section -.034 -.21 -
(N.l1,396) (.019) (.027)
Longitudinal
-.027 .080 -.044 -.21 -.091 - - .26
(11—2922) (.027) (.041) (.032) (.062) (.029) (.013)
Covered Departments
Cross Section .032 -.15 - - -
(N—3131) (.024)(.032)
Longitudinal .083 .066 -.092 -.087 -.077 - - .37
(N—.853) (.034) (.056) (.034) (.097) (.034) (.026)
Not Covered Depts.
Cross-Section -.25 -.27 - - - - -
(N—64l0) (.035) (.036)
Longitudinal
-.10 .12 .055 -.29 -.11 - - .25
(N—1468) (.054) (.065) (.075)(.098) (.056) (.018)
(con.)47
Table 8 (con.)
Legal Category Variable Means
all
other
Arbi- Strikes Arbi- Strikes cate-
tration Perm. tration Perm. gories
1980 1980 1972 1972 1972
Full Sample
Cross-Section .30 .096 - - -
Longitudinal .33 .092 .096 .033 .27
Covered Departments
Cross Section .54 .086 - -
Longitudinal .54 .068 .17 .016 .28
Not Covered Dents.
Cross-Section .13 .11 -
Longitudinal .16 .11 .050 .040 .31
Other variables controlled for in each regression are: population
(and interactions with three city-size dummies), per capita income, median
household income, median property values, percent of population with income
below 75% of poverty level, percent black, percent high school graduates,
percent with 1 to 3 years college, percent college graduates, percent
attended graduate school, region dummies (3), and department dummies (4).
Also, the cross-section regressions include year dummies (3).
1
The sample only includes departments in legal categories 6-9 (see table
1) in 1980.
2
Refers only to deparments covered by a collective bargaining contract in
1980. Coverage data is unavailable for 1972.48
the negative effects of arbitration clauses on wages and
employment for non-covered departments who do not use the
arbitration machinery (since they have no contract disputes to
be resolved by arbitration), which holds up even in the
longitudinal analysis. We do not have a good explanation for
this. Clearly it will require a model focusing not on union
behavior, as ours does, but on behavior of city-departments
that are not covered by contracts, particularly with regard to
their "spillover" behavior.
IV. Conclusion
This paper has examined the effect of the different legal
environments faced by public employees across the states on
wage and employment outcomes, using cross-section analyses,
within-city analyses, and longitudinal analyses. While the
investigation turned up some puzzles, the general tone of the
results is consistent with the notion that the legal
environment which governs public sector collective bargaining
influences outcomes through its impact on contract coverage,
and through its impact on wages and employment. In
particular, we find:
(1) State laws governing collective bargaining are a
major determinant of whether or not workers have contracts,
even controlling for the proportion of workers who are
organized and comparing departments within the same city.
(2) Collective bargaining coverage raises wages and49
employment, consistent with a model of public sector unionism
in which the unions use some of their resources to raise demand
for labor.
(3) A more favorable legal environment raises wages but
has virtually no effect on employment in departments covered by
collective bargaining, presumably because the laws strengthen
unions' ability to negotiate wage increases at the bargaining
table, which offsets any union pressure to raise employment.
For departments lacking collective bargaining contracts, a more
favorable legal environment induces wage gains similar to those
for departments with contracts, but reduces employment.
(4) Within cities, wage differences between departments
with contracts and those without contracts and between those
with more and less favorable collective bargaining laws are
quite modest, consistent with the Ichniowski-Zax analysis of
within-city spillovers. On the employment side, the impact of
differing legal environments within cities is again small,
consistent with the Ichniowski-Zax analysis. However, the
large positive effect of contract coverage on employment
persists even when we compare departments within the same
city.
(5) Among city departments covered by collective
contracts, arbitration clauses have little effect on wages but
positive effects on employment, while strike permitted clauses
raise wages but have an ambiguous effect on employment.
Turning -to the puzzles that our analysis has uncovered but50
failed to resolve, we found: that the CPS individual-
based data gives markedly higher estimates of union wage
effects than does the Soc establishment-based data; and that
noncovered departments with arbitration or the right to strike
do worse in terms of wages and employment than those with duty
to bargain but lacking closure laws.
All told, our analysis shows that the legal environment
for collective bargaining is an important determinant of the
presence of contracts and of outcomes in public sector labor
markets, and that what public sector unions do to their
employers differs in some important respects from what private
sector unions do, along lines consistent with a model in which
public sector unions use their resources to shift demand for
labor as well as to raise wages.51
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Appendix A -Derivationof the Longitudinal Bias Correction








Inthe text we note that this model does not yield
unbiased or consistent parameter estimates due to the negative
correlation between the residual -)p0 and W0. The correction
for this problem involves application of standard omitted
variable bias formulae.
Let a be the auxiliary regression coefficient of on L1
conditional on all other variables, let r be the accompanying
partial correlation coefficient, and let P (O￿Ps1) be the ratio
of the variance of to the variance of W. Then the bias on
c due to the omission of from the calculation is determined
by:
(Al) plim ,— (a/(l-r2))P+c
where c is the estimate of c and the plini is taken as the — w52
sample size tends to infinite.
The bias in estimating A is:
(A2) plim-A[l-(P/(l-r2)))
Regressing W0 on L1 and all of the variables in Equation
16 yields c—.031 and r— .0093 for the full sample wage
regressions reported in table 7.With these magnitudes, the
coefficient on L1 will not be greatly affected by the omission
of unless P is a very large number. The parameter P is the
ratio of the random (measurement error) variation of W0 to the
total variation in W0. Assume, as a reasonable approximation,
that one-tenth of the variance in W0 is due to sothat
P—i/b. With this value of P equations Al and A2 imply that A
is understated by .04 and that cis overstated by .001 in the
uncorrected estimates. As similarly small corrections were
derived for the employment regressions, we report uncorrected
estimates in table 7.53
Freeman & Valletta
Notes
1. Consistent with other studies --seeZax l985b, references
in Freeman 1986b.
2. See table 4 in Freeman 1986b.
3. AFSCME and John Burton provided us with their own lists of
the laws; see References for others.
4. We thank Jeffrey Zax for providing us with this extract.
Note that aggregation of the finance and control categories can
be justified on a priori grounds, due to the similarity of
services provided by the two categories (see Ehrenberg 1973,
p. 370) and the lack of department-specific bargaining unit
data for them (see note 5).
5. The relevant bargaining unit for the finance and control
category is clerical, since the finance and control departments
typically have a high percentage of clerical workers, and no
department-specific bargaining unit data was available for
them.
6. Note that while we have given all unions the same utility
function, factors that produce different utility functions
(differences in the age of union members, for example) would
enter the reduced form relations (6) just as do the L factors.
7. The latter category is excluded from some regressions, as no
data on percentage organized was available for finance and
control personnel; regressions without this category, and
without percentage organized, are included for purposes of
comparison.
8. Individuals who answer "yes" to the CPS union membership
question are automatically counted as "covered;" those who
answer "no" are then asked the coverage question. Thus, some
union members who are not covered are considered covered in the
CPS. The SOG coverage variable construction is described in
Section I.
9. We can crudely obtain logistic coefficients from the linear
model by dividing the linear coefficients by P(l-P), where P
denotes the mean coverage level for the sample.
10. This variable was formed by calculating the average log
usual hourly earnings for employed individuals with 2 and
4-year college degrees separately in each SMSA (and also for54
those "not in an SMSA"); the 4-year graduate average was
matched by SMSA for the teacher sample, while the other 3
groups were matched with the 2-year graduate average.
11. We ran the same regressions including revenue variables
(total tax revenues per capita and intergovernmental aid per
capita) as regressors. As inclusion of these variables did not
change the substantive results, and as there surely is a
simultaneous relation between taxes and municipal wages, which
we do not explore in this paper, we exclude the revenue
variables from ensuing calculations.
12. We ran the same regressions adding percentage organized in
the department as an additional control for unionism.
Controlling for the legal environment and coverage, the
estimated coefficient (standard error) on percentage organized
was .082 (.004) for the pooled sample, .079 (0.13) for covered
departments, and .085 (.005) for not covered departments.
These results are consistent with our model in which unions can
use resources to shift and/or move along a demand curve.
Results for the effect of percentage organized on employment
are given in note 15. We thank Charles Brown for suggesting
the use of this variable in the wage and employment equations.
13. Since the CPS data are based on individuals, with small
numbers by city, we cannot readily use the data for analysing
employment in demand relations.
14. Full-time equivalents were not used, since on average
part-time employment comprises less than 2% of total full-time
equivalent employment in our sample; thus, any union-induced
substitution from part-time to full-time employment can have
only negligible effects. Regressions using full-time
equivalents yielded similar results to those shown.
15. As with wages, we ran the same regressions with percentage
organized included. Controlling for the legal environment and
coverage, the estimated coefficient (standard error) on
percentage organized was .018 (.016) for the pooled sample, .24
(.033) for covered departments, and .025 (.019) for not
covered departments. These results, along with the wage
results from footnote 12, suggest that in covered departments,
a greater percentage organized substantially increases unions'
ability to both shift and move along a demand curve, while in
not covered departments percentage organized primarily
increases unions' ability to move along a demand curve
(possibly through threat effects). More research is needed in
this area before definitive conclusions can be drawn.
16. As with the coverage regressions from columns 3 and 4 of
table 3, we ran a pooled regression which included the usual
city characteristic variables and interactions between these55
and the four department dummies, to account for differences in
the effects of the city characteristics on wages and employment
in different departments. However, we constrain the omitted
city-specific effect to be the same for all departments.
17. A more exact comparison is provided by a cross-section wage
regression for only 1980 observations; it yielded a legal index
coefficient of .039.
18. One important related result is that covered and not
covered departments are subject to different wage and
employment determination processes. Chow tests on the reduced
form wage and employment equations, with the sample broken into
covered and not covered department sub-samples, yielded F
statistics which each attained the .01 significance level.
Although our substantive results are not changed by breaking
the sample into covered-not covered groups, future researchers
should be careful to consider this point.
19. We also attempted to estimate a structural demand equation.
However, due to lack of adequate supply instruments, we chose
not to pursue this avenue of inquiry in the current paper.
20. The overlap is imperfect for the "other local" category, as
we only have 3 other local groups (sanitation, streets and
highways, and finance & control personnel) in the SOG, while
the CPS contains more.
21. In particular, we find that the estimated coefficients
(standard errors) in 1980 are .21 (.085) for state employees,
.22 (.071) for other local employees, and .19 (.044) for
teachers. These results are not strictly comparable to the
1984 results since the May 1980 sample is much smaller than our
1984 sample, and since extraction of the state and other local
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